Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Metaphysical Possibility: Metaphysical possibility is the strongest of the various types of possibility. It cannot be judged within the framework of our actual world. Weaker types are logical possibility and physical possibility. See also Possibility, Logical Possibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Metaphysical Possibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: that is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be seen as "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Possibility. I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. >Predicates, >Predication. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. ((s) Even without meaning postulates.) (Meaning postulate/(s): this is about the scope of logic.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Metaphysical Possibility
